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U
The Consent Exception to
The Warrant Requirement
by H. Patrick FurmanOne exception to the general
rule that authorities must
obtain a warrant before con-
ducting a search is the con-
sent exception. This article discusses
that exception, the procedure for prov-
ing that the exception applies and vari-
ous opinions examining the exception.
An Overview of the
Consent Exception
In virtually identical language, both
the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution and Article II, § 7 of the Colo-
rado Constitution protect people from un-
reasonable searches and seizures. Judi-
cial enforcement of this provision did not
begin in earnest until this century.' En-
forcement of the provision through the
exclusionary rule is designed to deter
misconduct by law enforcement officials,
2
although it also serves the purpose of
maintaining the integrity of the judici-
ary.
3
A search conducted without benefit of
warrant is presumed unreasonable and
in violation of the constitutional prohibi-
tion.4 The prosecution can overcome this
presumption by proving that valid con-
sent was obtained prior to the search.5 A
consent to search surrenders the legiti-
mate expectation of privacy protected by
the Constitution and waives the warrant
requirement. 6 If the person to be searched
validly consents to the search, there is
no police misconduct and there is no jus-
tification for excluding evidence obtained
in that search.
7
Column Ed.: H. Patrick Furman,
University of Colorado School of
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The definition of a search does not in-
clude all police intrusions. Simply knock-
ing on a person's door does not amount
to a search, since the occupant retains
the right not to answer.8 Similarly, a
proper investigative detention pat-down
of a suspect does not require consent.9
Procedural and
General Considerations
A defendant may raise a claim that
evidence was improperly seized without
valid consent by filing a motion to sup-
press. The defendant may always chal-
lenge his or her own purported consent
but does not automatically have stand-
ing to challenge consent given by anoth-
er. In People v. Henry,10 the Colorado Su-
preme Court held that the defendant,
who was a passenger in a car that had
been lawfully stopped by the police, was
not entitled to automatic standing to con-
test the search of the car conducted with
the consent of the owner. The defendant's
mere presence in the car did not give him
a reasonable expectation of privacy con-
ferring standing to contest the search."
Once a claim is raised, the burden is
on the prosecution to prove that the con-
sent exception applies. 12 The determina-
tion of whether consent was given is
based on a consideration of the totality
of the circumstances. '3 These circum-
stances include the age, intelligence, ed-
ucation and knowledge of the purpose of
the search of the person giving consent,
as well as any promises, threats, over-
bearing conduct or misrepresentations
by the authorities.
14
The prosecution must prove the exis-
tence of consent by clear and convincing
evidence.15 Unless the trial court specifi-
cally bases its ruling on the Colorado
Constitution, appellate courts presume
that the ruling is based on the U.S. Con-
stitution. 
16
Appellate courts are to accept the fac-
tual findings of the trial court as long as
they are supported by the record, even
when the reviewing court disagrees with
the findings." In People v. Diaz,18 the Col-
orado Supreme Court affirmed a trial
court order suppressing evidence seized
from the defendant when he was arrest-
ed and searched in a bar without a war-
rant. The trial court resolved certain
credibility issues in favor of the defen-
dant, made detailed findings that the
actions of the police were such as would
convince an ordinary person that he or
she was under arrest and found that the
"request" of the police to search was more
in the nature of an order. These findings
were supported by the record and the
trial court's credibility determinations.
The trial court's conclusion that the pros-
ecution failed to meet its burden of prov-
ing consent was therefore affirmed.
Trial courts should indulge every rea-
sonable presumption against a waiver.19
Thus, ambiguous or imprecise questions
or answers may result in a finding that
the prosecution has failed to prove con-
sent. In People v. Thomas,20 a police offi-
cer requested consent to search both the
defendant and his car in one question.
The trial court made a finding that this
compound question resulted in an am-
biguous answer. The Supreme Court con-
sidered itself bound by this finding be-
cause it was supported by the record,21
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and affirmed the trial court's suppres-
sion order even while strongly hinting
that it might have reached a different
conclusion had it been sitting as the find-
er of fact.
Consent must be voluntary. In Schneck-
loth v. Bustamonte,2 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that proof that consent was
voluntary requires a showing that there
has been "an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right." That
Court also has described the prosecu-
tion's burden as one of proving "that the
consent was, in fact, freely and volun-
tarily given. This burden cannot be dis-
charged by showing no more than acqui-
escence to a claim of lawful authority."2
The Colorado Supreme Court has of-
fered several similar descriptions of the
requirement. In People v. Reyes, 24 the
court held that proof of voluntariness re-
quires proof".. . that there was no du-
ress or coercion, express or implied; and
that the consent was unequivocal and
specific and freely and intelligently giv-
en." Similarly, in People v. Savage,25 the
court held that a valid consent "must be
the product of a free choice and must not
be the result of duress, coercion, threats,
or promises that are calculated to flaw
the free and unconstrained nature of the
decision."26 In People v. Thiret,27 volun-
tariness was described as meaning that
the "consent was not the result of duress
or coercion, express or implied, or any
other form of undue influence exercised
against the defendant."2
The Scope of Consent
The fact that consent is given does not
authorize the police to search anywhere
or for as long as they wish. Consent "may
be confined in scope to specific items...
or may be restricted to certain areas or lo-
cation ... or otherwise may be limited in
purpose and time."29 The scope of the
consent may be limited by the language
of the request or by the language of the
consent. A number of cases have ad-
dressed the scope of a consent to a search.
The specific language of the request to
search may limit the scope of the search.
In Thiret,3° the police arrived at the defen-
dant's home without a warrant and asked
if they could "look around." The defen-
dant said yes, and the police then spent
forty-five minutes searching the entire
house, including piles of clothes and de-
bris, boxes and drawers. The Colorado Su-
preme Court ruled that this search ex-
ceeded the scope of the consent and that
the subsequent seizure of some photo-
graphs and film was improper. On the oth-
er hand, consent to "search" a home en-
compasses police actions such as photo-
graphing and measuring the premises.
3 1
The person giving consent may specif-
ically limit the scope of the consent. In
People v. Billington,32 the defendant in a
bad check case consented to a search of
his hotel room to find papers belonging
to the victim and relating to the com-
mon business interest of himself and the
victim. The Supreme Court held that
the police must stay within the limita-
tions of this consent or obtain a warrant
for a more general search. However, the
court went on to hold that this search
was within the scope of the limited con-
sent.
"Proof that consent was
voluntary requires a showing




The U.S. Supreme Court has held that
consent to search the interior of a car
justified the search of any closed con-
tainers in the car that might reasonably
contain the object of the search.33 A po-
lice officer had stopped the car and asked
to search for drugs. He found a kilo of co-
caine inside a rolled up paper bag on the
floor.
The most recent Colorado opinion on
the scope of consent is People v. Olivas,3
in which the Supreme Court reversed
the suppression of marijuana found hid-
den behind the door panels of a car. The
defendant was stopped because his wind-
shield was cracked. Due to some suspi-
cious information, the officer asked if the
defendant would consent to a search of
the car, and the defendant agreed. The of-
ficer found nothing in the car or in the
trunk, but then noticed that the door pan-
el on the driver's door was loose. Using
his flashlight, the officer saw what ap-
peared to be marijuana hidden in the
door, pried the panel off and found mar-
ijuana. Analyzing the issue on federal
grounds only, the court noted that con-
sent may be specifically limited by the
suspect, but held that consent does au-
thorize a thorough and careful search.
The court held that the search was with-
in the scope of the consent and was rea-
sonable. 5
Consent is not limitless in terms of time,
either. People v. rujillo36 held that "the
question of the temporal scope of a con-
sent to search is also a question of fact
to be determined in light of all of the cir-
cumstances." 7 In Trujillo, the defendant
consented to a search of his impounded
car on August 9. The police found noth-
ing, but searched the car again two days
later after their suspicions were aroused
by the repeated demands of the defen-
dant's wife to return the car. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's rul-
ing that the second search fell within
the temporal scope of the consent because
the consent was not limited in time by its
own terms and because the defendant
should have foreseen that his car would
remain impounded for some period of
time.
Once consent is granted, it may not be
withdrawn. In People v. Heimel,38 the
Colorado Supreme Court held that an air
traveler who impliedly consented to a
search by beginning the security screen-
ing process could not withdraw that con-
sent by withdrawing from the check-
point. Similarly, the court has held that
a person who initially consented to a
search of his car trunk could not change
his mind and validly withdraw consent
after the search began.
39
Third-Party Consent
In certain situations, a person other
than the defendant may give valid con-
sent to search. Whether a third party may
validly consent usually turns on the re-
lationship of the third party to the prop-
erty to be searched (for example, the own-
er/occupier may give consent) or the re-
lationship of the third party to the per-
son who is the target of the search.4° Gen-
erally, the person with the principal right
to occupancy is the only person who may
give consent. However, there are a num-
ber of situations in which third parties
may validly consent to a search. Appel-
late courts have addressed the issue in a
number of opinions.
In the case of rental property, it is nor-
mally the tenant who has the sole right
to give consent.41 A landlord who found
marijuana in a house she leased to the de-
fendant on a month-to-month basis did
not have authority to authorize the po-
lice to search the home.42 However, a co-
tenant has the authority to authorize a
search of the common areas of the shared
property,4 and a co-tenant who shares
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specific rooms with the suspect may au-
thorize a search of those rooms.4 In a sit-
uation where the landlord was the defen-
dant's mother, occupied the same prem-
ises and controlled access to all parts of
the premises, she had authority to con-
sent to a search of the home, and the po-
lice could lawfully arrest the defendant
after spotting him inside.
45
The owner or occupier of property
may cede the authority to consent to a
search to a third person. The defendant
in People v. Rivers," gave his trailer key
to the owner of the trailer park in which
he lived and told him to use the key in
case of emergency. The owner called the
police after getting complaints about of-
fensive odors emanating from the trail-
er. A police search yielded a dead body.
The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the
search, holding that the defendant had
granted the power to consent to the third
party.
The consent of one spouse to allow a
search of the premises binds the other
spouse .4 The issue in People v. Payne"
was whether the defendant's estranged
wife had authority to consent to a search
of the jointly owned marital home after
she had moved out. After the defendant
was arrested on a suspicion of sexually
assaulting the wife, the wife entered the
home and gave police permission to
search. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the defendant's conviction, noting that
the defendant and the victim had a com-
mon interest in the home and that the
victim went to the home to retrieve some
of her personal property. The court held
that she had the authority to consent.
Actual authority to consent to a search
is not a prerequisite of third-party con-
sent if the police were justified in an ob-
jectively reasonable belief that the party
giving consent had authority. In People
v. McKinstrey,49 the Colorado Supreme
Court reviewed a trial court order sup-
pressing evidence found in the search of
a mountain cabin. An officer searched
the cabin after learning some suspicious
information about the occupant and af-
ter a nearby resident named Drumm
claimed part ownership of the cabin and
consented to the search. The trial court
found that Drumm did not possess au-
thority to consent to a search because he
did not have joint access to and control
over the cabin for most purposes. The tri-
al court based its suppression order on
this finding.
The Supreme Court held that the fac-
tual finding was supported by the record
but that the finding did not resolve the
constitutional issue. The federal consti-
tutional analysis is governed by Illinois
v. Rodriguez,5° which held that the "rea-
sonableness" requirement of the Fourth
Amendment applies to the analysis of
consent searches and that it does not au-
tomatically bar all "consent" searches
that are conducted without proper con-
sent. If the officers conducting the search
believed they had valid consent, and if
that belief was objectively reasonable, the
results of the search should not be sup-
pressed. The officers should make in-
quiry regarding the authority of the per-
son giving consent to do so.51 Because
the trial court in McKinstrey did not ful-
ly consider this question, the case was re-
manded for further findings. Colorado's
Supreme Court explicitly declined to con-
sider the issue under the Colorado Con-
stitution.
The most recent Colorado Supreme
Court decision on the issue of third-party
consent is People v. Hopkins.52 In Hop-
kins, three police officers investigating
an illegal fireworks call were approached
by the defendant and two other people.
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When identification was requested, the
defendant accompanied one officer to his
apartment to get identification, and the
other two people stayed with the other
two officers. When these two people in-
dicated that they did not have identifi-
cation, one officer asked to look in the
fanny pack one of them was carrying. The
person consented, and the officer found
crack cocaine, marijuana and identifica-
tion belonging to the defendant inside.
Both people then indicated that the fan-
ny pack belonged to the defendant.
The trial court granted the defendant's
motion to suppress, but the Supreme
Court reversed. The test for third-party
consent was described as whether the
facts available to the officer at the time
of the search justify a reasonably cau-
tious person in the belief that the consent-
ing party had authority over the proper-
ty,53 and the court held that such facts
did exist. Neither the fact that the con-
senting party did not have actual con-
sent, nor the failure of the officers to in-
quire into the ownership of the pack al-
tered this conclusion.
Implied Consent
Normally, the waiver of a fundamen-
tal constitutional right requires express
consent by the person holding the right.
However, in certain situations, the Col-
orado Supreme Court has found that
consent may be implied by the actions of
the defendant. In Heimel,54 discussed
above, the court held that entering an
airport and beginning the security screen-
ing process constituted a consent to a
search.
In People v. Renfrow,55 police officers
were inspecting a car that was believed
to have been involved in a recent bur-
glary. The defendant approached them,
gave information about the car, volun-
teered that he had the keys inside and
invited them in. The house was dark, and
the officers had to use their flashlights,
revealing stolen property in plain view.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that
the defendant voluntarily consented for
the police to enter, grafted the plain view
exception onto the consent exception and
upheld the admission of the results of
the search.
An invitation to enter a residence, cou-
pled with an agreement to speak with the
officers, also was held to be a consent to
a search in People v. Clouse.56 Police offi-
cers investigating an auto theft found
an outstanding warrant for the defen-
dant. They knocked on the defendant's
motel room door, stepped inside to pat
him down and asked if they could speak
with him. The defendant replied "sure"
and invited the officers into the room.
Inside, the officers noticed a weapon
and cuffed and advised the defendant. A
search of his room turned up evidence im-
plicating the defendant in burglary, theft
and forgery.
The Clouse court first noted that the
police may constitutionally knock on a
door for investigative purposes because
the occupant retains the right to refuse to
open the door.5 7 The record supported the
trial court's conclusion that the defen-
dant then validly consented to the entry
by the police officers. The search of the
motel room was justified as a search in-
cident to the arrest.
5 8
Such implied consent has limits. In
People v. Lingo,59 the defendant and an-
other person entered a prison facility for
a visit. Both the paperwork and the fa-
cility's signs put visitors on notice that
there would be a search. Just after they
walked through the metal detector, a
balloon with a white powdery substance
was found on the floor. The defendant
was arrested, questioned, taken to the
sheriff's office and searched. The trial
court found that there was no probable
cause justifying the arrest. The prosecu-
tion argued that the search fell within
the scope of the consent exception creat-
ed by the consent form and warning sign.
The Supreme Court rejected that argu-
ment, holding that the consent was lim-
ited to a search at the correctional facili-
ty and that the search at the sheriff's of-
fice exceeded the scope of that consent.
Tainted Consent
Improper police actions preceding a
consent may taint that consent and ren-
der it invalid. In People v. Cleburn, the
Colorado Supreme Court held that "when
consent is given after an interrogation
in violation of Miranda, the consent is
likely to be constitutionally infirm, taint-
ed by the unconstitutional interroga-
tion."6° Similarly, if consent is obtained
after an unlawful entry, it is likely to be
constitutionally infirm. 6 1 Consent ob-
tained through deception by the police is
generally tainted by that deception.
62
As in other search and seizure situa-
tions, the taint may become so attenuat-
ed that it no longer affects the validity of
the consent, and the trial court should
still consider the totality of the circum-
stances, including the defendant's age,
education, intelligence and state of mind,
as well as the duration, location and oth-
er circumstances of the search in deter-
mining whether consent has been vol-
untarily given.63
While consent may be tainted by im-
proper police conduct prior to the con-
sent, it is not tainted by the simple fact
that there is some sort of police-citizen
encounter prior to the consent. The de-
fendant in People v. Johnson6 was stand-
ing in line to board a plane when he was
approached by two police officers who
asked for identification and some other
information. They gave him back his iden-
tification and asked if he would consent
to a search, which he did.
The trial court found that there was
no probable cause or reasonable suspi-
cion for the initial contact and that the
subsequent consent was tainted by this
illegal contact. The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the initial contact
between the defendant and the police
did not even rise to the level of an inves-
tigatory stop and that the subsequent
consent to search given by the defen-
dant was not tainted by the initial en-
counter. The consent issue should there-
fore be analyzed on its own merits, and
the court, after reviewing the relevant
factors, held the consent was voluntary.
The most recent review of a claim that
police action tainted a consent to search
came in People v. Gillis.6 5 As the police
were about to conduct a search of the
defendant's home, they realized that the
address was incorrectly listed on the
warrant. They told the defendant that
they would secure his house until a cor-
rected warrant was obtained. The defen-
dant then signed a consent to search form.
The Supreme Court affirmed a ruling
that this consent was voluntary, finding
that the police were entitled to secure
the home until the corrected warrant ar-
rived and that there were no threats or
coercion, that the defendant's state of
mind was unimpaired, and that no prom-
ises were made in exchange for the con-
sent.
Conclusion
It seems that a surprisingly high per-
centage of suspects in criminal cases co-
operate with the police, either by mak-
ing statements or authorizing searches
that incriminate themselves. Knowledge
of the contours of the consent exception
to the warrant requirement is important
to the effective practice of criminal law
and proper administration of the crimi-
nal justice system.
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